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Introduction
When Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act shortly after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, it responded to a call for increased executive authority in the fight against
threats to our national security. The consequences of this legislative action are still being
assessed, but one thing appears clear: as a nation and by this legislation, we sought to enhance
executive authority to prevent further threats to public safety in the United States. The means by
which Congress sought to address such threats includes an enhanced prosecutorial authority to
act, frequently out of the public’s view, in derogation of traditional notions of individual liberty
and privacy, and beyond the reach of officers of the judicial branch.
Among the uncertainties engendered by the legislative reaction to 9/11 is the broad
question of the consequences of shifting power from the judicial branch to the executive branch
of government. What are the consequences, for example, of authorizing warrantless arrests based
on suspicion of an immigration status violation, or of authorizing the Attorney General to detain
any noncitizen whom the Attorney General has certified as a spy or terrorist? When the judicial
branch cedes to the executive branch its authority to evaluate in advance of arrest the merits of a
proposed criminal detention or prosecution, and when lawmakers invest more heavily in the
prosecutorial offices than in the judiciary, what results can be predicted?
While these may be untested waters, given the calamity and extraordinary character of
the events that spawned this shift in power, there are bases upon which some predictions might
reasonably be founded. There is evidence already available to us that might shed light on the
implications of this shift, evidence that might suggest the scope of the dangers we invite by
divesting our courts of powers traditionally held in the judicial branch of government. It is the
thesis central to this article that certain predictions can be made based on well-established data
and reason, about the consequences of shifting power from the judiciary to the executive and its
prosecutorial functions. These predictions flow from research and reasoning drawn from another
institution that relies heavily on balancing the roles of prosecutor and the judiciary: criminal
sentencing. For it is in the area of criminal sentencing that we have been witnesses to a
substantial loss of judicial power, power that has been diverted from the court to the prosecutor
and in some instances coopted by the electorate or specific classes of unelected persons, so that
the power is both nonresponsive to the rule of law and wholly unaccountable.
The theory, then, behind this thesis is that we have a substantial body of research and
analysis illuminating both the causes and the effects of shifting power from the judicial branch
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and to the executive branch (through its prosecutor). Legislation that deprives courts of
discretion at the time of sentencing, through sentencing commissions and mandatory minimum
sentences, offers a concrete example of such a shift in power. The beneficiaries of this shift –
prosecutors who are freed from the vagaries of sentencing discretion exercised by judges – can
provide an evidentiary basis for making predictions for what happens when the executive branch
is given unbridled and unchecked authority and the judicial branch is in equal measure deprived
of that authority. Lessons learned from this shift in power may then be used to inform
predictions concerning the consequences – intended or otherwise – of shifts in power occasioned
by legislation inspired by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
Singularly disturbing about these lessons, I propose, is the consequence that much of the
criminal justice apparatus concerning pre-warrant detention, currently forced into the light of
day, will forever be closed to defense counsel, to the courts, and ultimately to the public. These
lessons suggest that once authorized to detain without warrant whole new classes of persons, the
prosecutorial offices will be able to preempt and ultimately negate firmly rooted constitutional
protections limiting the power of the government to control the liberty of the governed. Where
before 9/11 the prosecutor would be required to solicit the support of a judicial officer before
taking a person into custody, there will be in the absence of such a requirement a fundamental
shift away from due process as we know it, and in derogation of fundamental human rights.
Further, I propose that we have a substantial base of knowledge and experience in support of
these predictions, particularly with respect to use and abuse of power by prosecutors when
prosecutorial functions are removed from public scrutiny. Drawing from these premises, I
propose that courts have an affirmative duty to anticipate the unwarranted diminution of
constitutional and human rights occasioned by this shift of power, and exercise judicial authority
in a manner designed to preserve those rights.
I.

The Done Deal: Post 9/11 Legislation
A.

USA Patriot Act

Within eight days of September 11, the Bush Administration and its Attorney General,
John Ashcroft, proposed what would be known as the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot
Act), which was signed into law on October 26, 2001.1 Among its many provisions, the Act
“grants additional wiretapping and surveillance authority to federal law enforcement, removes
barriers between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, adds financial disclosure and
reporting requirements to combat terrorist funding, and gives greater authority to the Attorney
General to detain and deport aliens suspected of having terrorist ties.”2
More specifically within the USA Patriot Act, the Bush Administration sought authority
to indefinitely detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism, without ever filing charges against the
suspect.3 Congress resisted this, and the Act as enacted permits unwarranted detention for seven
days, after which the suspect must be charged.4 But this seven-day limit is not universally
effective as a check against prosecutorial abuse. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
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Penalty Act of 1996,5 the Attorney General is required to detain and remove aliens convicted of
certain crimes, and the Court has construed this to provide for indefinite detention of those not
deportable because their country of origin would not accept them.6 As a result of the USA Patriot
Act and prior anti-terrorist laws, the Attorney General is given the power “to detain indefinitely
not only those convicted of crimes or immigration offenses, as under old law, but also any person
the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is a terrorist or ‘is engaged in any other
activity that endangers the national security of the United States.’ Thus, the USA Patriot Act
extends the Attorney General’s powers beyond those granted in the 1996 legislation and may
give the Attorney General unfettered discretion to determine who is a terrorist. Furthermore,
judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision is only available through habeas corpus
proceedings.”7
Under the USA Patriot Act, the acts of terrorism to which the Attorney General is given
such broad powers includes “any group that engages in violence or the destruction of property,”
presumably including “advocacy groups causing minor property damage during an act of civil
disobedience,” and is not limited to foreign or international groups.8
B.

Immigration: Indefinite Detention under INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R.
287.3
Pursuant to an amendment effective September 17, 2001, 8 C.F.R. section 287.3(d)9,
permits the Immigration and Naturalization Service to ‘detain individuals indefinitely following
a warrantless arrest without bringing any charges against them, in times of “emergency or
extraordinary circumstance.”10 Commentators have expressed three-fold concerns about these
amendments, arising from constitutional law and public policy: “The amended regulation
infringes upon Fourth Amendment rights both in the context of immigration law enforcement
itself and in the Attorney General’s repeated suggestion that immigration law endorsement is
being used to effectuate criminal law enforcement purposes. The amended rule also violates
fundamental principles of due process rights by detaining individuals for indefinite periods of
time without establishing cause. Finally, the rule creates a policy that undermines its purpose by
simultaneously sweeping up thousands of innocent individuals whose rights effectively have
been terminated, and creating a sense of fear in communities already reeling from violence
directed at them by the public.”11
The amended rule repeals the requirement that the INS bring the arrestee in front of an
examining officer within twenty-four hours and replaces it with a forty-eight hour requirement.
The amended rule also provides that in the event of ‘an emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance,” the INS is afforded ‘an additional reasonable period of time” to examine the
arrestee, and is not subject to any specific time period within which it must perform this
examination. The amended regulation thus allows immigrants arrested without a warrant to be
held indefinitely without even the minimal protection of a determination that the INS has prima
facie evidence of any violation.”12
II.

Shifts in Judicial and Executive Power in Modern Penalism
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The shift of power from the judiciary to the executive branch manifested in the USA
Patriot Act and in the 2001 amendments to 8 C.F.R. 287.3 signal a significant diversion of
oversight away from our courts and in favor of the executive branch. Prosecutorial discretion
now controls the decision whether to confine suspects who arguably at least meet definitional
prerequisites, in a process that until now had called for judicial oversight. Such a shift may well
reflect a determination by lawmakers and by the public at large, that courts are simply incapable
of responding to threats to our national security in a manner sufficiently tuned and nimble to
effectively address such threats. Public support may also be attributed to a collective perception
that any adverse consequence flowing from these legislative initiatives will have an impact only
upon immigrants and will spare the middle-class electorate. History gives substance to these
suppositions, particularly if one examines parallels that exist between the public’s reaction to
post 9/11 terroristic threat with its reaction to rising crime rates in the late 1970s and early to mid
1980s.
A.
Predicates to the Shift
In his seminal and widely respected work on crime and social order, “The Culture of
Control,”13 David Garland (Professor of Law and Sociology, New York University School of
Law) describes what he refers to as the “crisis of modern penalism” as a multifaceted reaction to
penal welfarism. Drawing from critical examinations of the corrections movement that
predominated penal practices in the United States between the end of World War II to the
beginning of the 1970, Garland provides a chronological map of the rise of prosecutorial power
and the erosion of the judicial role in criminal justice systems. Viewed from the 1960s and early
1970s, criminal justice and sentencing systems in the United States bore the earmarks often
associated with social welfare programs. Crime at the time was viewed as “a product of social
and economic deprivation,” and the public “looked to the state to provide the social reforms and
welfare support needed to address this social program.”14
During the 1970s and even more so during the Reagan years in the 1980s, this view of
crime and punishment in America shifted significantly away from a focus on the offender and in
favor of the victim of crime. Notable in this period were influential reports that directly
challenged the role courts should play in the criminal justice system, with calls for the repeal of
indeterminate sentencing laws, restrictions on the use of parole, imposition of fixed term
sentences geared not towards the offender but based wholly on the offense, and ‘presumptive
sentencing’ aimed at reducing sentence disparity.15 In the place of rehabilitation, these reports
pursued an agenda of “retributive justice,” a penological approach that “stressed the moral
superiority of proportional, backward-looking punishment. . . .”16 As Garland puts it, ‘[f]or the
first time in decades, and in stark contrast to the prevailing orthodoxy, a prominent work of
penology argued a general case for retributive punishment as an end in itself.”17 The trend
charted by Garland revealed the hope that crime would be addressed by “[b]etter, more vigorous
policing and harsher, more certain punishments. . . more deterrence and control, not welfare.” 18
Concurrent with the demise of correctionalism and the rise of retributive justice in the
late 1970s and throughout the 1980 was a “hardening of social divisions,” as Garland puts it,
separating by wealth and social position those with jobs and those without.
The social and economic distance between the jobless and those in
work, blacks and whites, affluent suburbs and strife-torn inner
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cities, consumers in a booming private sector and claimants left
behind in collapsing public institutions grew ever greater in these
years, until it became a common place of political and social
commentary. In place of the solidaristic ideals of the Great Society
of the Welfare State there emerged a deeply divided society –
variously described as the ‘dualized society’, the ‘thirty, thirty,
forty society,’ the ‘seduced and repressed,’ or, in the USA where
social divisions were overlaid by racial ones, ‘American
Apartheid’ – with one sector being disciplined in the name of
traditional morality.

Garland also notes that by the last third of the twentieth century, society in the United
States had largely acknowledged the “normality of high crime rates” and the limitations of the
criminal justice state to do much about those rates.19 This dual realization led to the debunking
of what Garland refers to as the “myth of the sovereign state and its monopoly of crime
control.”20 Pervasive crime and a realization that the state is ill-prepared to mitigate such rates of
crime took a toll on the criminal justice system, and on the political structures that shape the
system. Governments at all levels in the late 1980s through to the present, have had to
acknowledge that government alone might promise but cannot deliver effective crime control. At
the same time, however, the public continues to demand policies that inspire trust and confidence
in the security of their lives and property. As Garland explains,
The emergent outcome is a series of policies that appear deeply
conflicted. . . . On the one hand, there has been an attempt to face
up to the predicament and develop pragmatic new strategies that
are adapted to it: through institutional reforms aimed at
overcoming the limits of the criminal justice state, or else through
accommodations that recognize these limitations and work within
them. But alongside these difficult adaptations to the reality
principle, there is a recurring attempt to evade its terms altogether,
particularly on the part of elected officials who play an
increasingly prominent role in criminal justice policy-making. The
politicized reaction takes two recurring forms. Either it wilfully
denies the predicament and reasserts the old myth of the sovereign
state and its plenary power to punish. Or else it abandons reasoned,
instrumental action and retreats into an expressive mode that we
might. . . describe as acting out – a mode that is concerned not so
much with controlling crime as with expressing the anger and
outrage that crime provokes.21

Courts and lawyers can ill-afford to overlook the threats to civil liberties at stake when
legislatures engage in the kind of “acting out” described by Garland. And there are lessons to be
learned by considering past instances where legislative reactions were fueled by a desire to
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express anger and outrage, at the expense of reasoned, instrumental action. That anger and
outrage, palpable and unstoppable in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, may well
have been the dominant driving force for the swift passage of the USA Patriot Act and related
legislation. It thus stands to reason that many of the concerns Garland raises about modern
penology may be of value when assessing the impact of the Act on criminal justice systems in
America.
B.

The Role of Extraordinary Events

If, as Garland proposes, lawmakers have recognized the limits of the sovereign state to
control criminal conduct, and at the same time lawmakers are to be responsive to public demands
for action to prevent crime or at least punish criminals, then legislative responses to public
outcries may well have a direct impact on the role of courts in the criminal process. If the public
is convinced that the state is powerless or less than adequate to meet the threat of crime, it will
invest less trust and authority in the state and retain more of it for itself. Consider the public
reaction to the heinous crime that took the life of Polly Klaas. A recidivist offender, released
from prison after serving less than a full sentence, kidnaps and kills an attractive, suburban,
white teenage girl, inspiring a national movement towards what became the “three strikes” laws.
Stark policies of punishment aimed at retribution for its own sake can quickly fill the media
markets after this kind of sensational and largely anomalous criminal event. As Garland explains,
“the new political imperative is that victims must be protected; their voices must be heard, their
memory honoured, their anger expressed, their fears addressed. The naming of criminal laws and
penal measures for crime victims (Megan’s law, Jenny’s law, Stephanie’s law, and most recently
the British campaign for Sarah’s law) purports to honour them in this way, though there is
undoubtedly an element of exploitation here too, as the individual’s name is used to fend off
objections to measures that are often nothing more than retaliatory legislation passed for public
display and political advantage.”22 The consequence of such exploitation, Garland argues, is a
shift of the debate “away from the instrumental reasoning of crime control analysis towards the
visceral emotions of identification and righteous indignation. Once this shift has been effected,
the terms of the debate are transformed and ‘facts’ become ‘less persuasive than the moral
authority of grief.’”23
Yet there is a danger associated accommodating, unquestioningly, the force of such
momentum. If our nation has responded to the attacks of September 11 by enacting laws that
shift power from courts to prosecutors, and has done so without a reasoned examination of the
need for such a shift and in favor of our “visceral emotions,” then consequences both unintended
and profound may await. We have reason to be cautious, given the consequences of “acting out”
that can be tied to criminal sentencing reforms like the “three strikes” laws passed after the
murder of Polly Klaas.
The “three strikes” laws are useful here because they offer a concrete example of a
deliberate act by lawmakers – driven by an intensely motivated and agitated public – to divest
the judicial branch of power and transfer that power to the executive branch through its
prosecutor. In much the same way, the USA Patriot Act and other anti-terrorist legislation invests
substantial power and discretion in the prosecutor, preemptive of judicial involvement. The
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public may well have expressed its desire to enhance a sense of national security – to the extent
that it even was aware of the details of this legislation during the two months immediately after
our country was attacked. Even so, however, courts must be wary of legislation that restricts the
power of the judiciary to act, as experience teaches with the “three-strikes” legislation.
In his address to members of the American Bar Association during its 2003 annual
meeting, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy encouraged members of the legal profession to
examine criminal justice issues having to do with sentencing and incarceration.24 Expressly
citing mandatory minimum sentences, Justice Kennedy urged legal professionals to reevaluate
the wisdom of penal systems that rely on what he perceived as unduly long sentences and
sentencing schemes which divest courts of discretion to impose sentences that are suited to the
diverse goals of incarceration. Among the comments which brought the audience of lawyers and
judges to their feet in ovation were his very clear and direct challenges to legislation that has led
to inflated, over-long terms of imprisonment, and that reduce the discretionary power of judges.
A key subtext of Justice Kennedy’s remarks was the proposition that there has been a
profound and widespread realignment of power away from the judiciary and in favor of the
executive branch of government. This realignment is most apparent in criminal proceedings at
both the state and federal levels, and most directly impacts the administration of justice at the
time of sentencing and throughout the period of incarceration. In a nation that currently
imprisons more than 1.2 million of its citizens and has the world’s highest per capita prison
population, Justice Kennedy saw a particular urgency in the need for active involvement by legal
professionals, involvement that should, in his view, require a reevaluation of sentencing terms
and most importantly lead to the abolishment of mandatory minimum sentences.
C.

Derogation of Accountability

Although not always transparent, one concrete consequence of legislation aimed at
responding to atrocities and crimes of extraordinary public interest is the diminution of discretion
on the part of the governmental actor. The “culture of control” described by Garland is one by
which public action is aimed increasingly at limiting options for courts when responding to
criminal conduct. Mandatory minimum sentences, for example, spawned in reaction to the Polly
Klaas murder, remove from the courts discretion with respect to sentencing the recidivist
offender. Instead of the elected or appointed judicial officer rendering a reasoned sentence based
upon the facts presented in open court, the terms of an offender’s sentence is prescribed by
lawmakers who know nothing about the circumstances of the particular case. Once a prosecutor
determines to charge an accused offender with a three-strikes law, the court has no choice but to
impose the enhanced sentence if the accused is convicted, regardless of circumstances in
mitigation of such a sentence. While there is some measure of accountability – the prosecutor
generally is held accountable through the process of public election – the steps leading to a
prosecutor’s decision to pursue or avoid the enhanced sentence are conducted wholly outside of
the public view.
III.

Lessons From a Comparative Prosecutorial System: Japan
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In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, the criminal justice system was quite predictably
rocked by calls for action. Poised with an almost disquieting prescience was the United States
Department of Justice and its Attorney General, John Ashcroft, ready almost before the fact, with
legislation that would materially enhance prosecutorial power and remove judicial oversight in
the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal and terroristic conduct.25 Significant
legislative authority was proposed, by which federal prosecutors would have the power to detain
suspects without first securing court approval and in some instances without ever needing such
approval. How significant is this power, and what are the implications on criminal justice
systems in general?
Some light can be shed on these questions by considering the prosecutorial culture of
Japan. Such a comparison might be warranted in part because the Japanese prosecutorial system
is a relatively unified system, at least when compared to the multi-tiered and multi-jurisdictional
prosecutorial systems in the United States. Also, much of the prosecutorial system is of relatively
recent vintage, evolving from reforms put into place by the occupational forces – predominately
from the United States – following World War II. Further, the comparative prosecutorial systems
of the United States and Japan have been the subject of careful and well-documented study.
Inquiries and analyses into Japanese prosecutorial systems, and comparisons of those systems
with modern prosecutorial practices in the United States, supply a substantial base of knowledge,
from social scientists in both Japan and the United States.26
Most useful in this comparison, however, is the parallel that may be drawn from where
Japanese prosecutorial culture is today and how it compares with where prosecutorial systems in
the United States appear to be heading. In many ways, the procuracy in Japan – its national cadre
of criminal prosecutors – already enjoy many of the advantages sought by the United States and
its Attorney General in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11. If post-9/11 legislation
achieves some of its more prominent goals – including divesting judicial involvement in key precharging criminal processes – then the Japanese model may serve as a valuable resource for
judges, lawyers, and lawmakers in the United States.
A.
Key Differences in Prosecutorial Systems
In “The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan,” (Oxford 2002) David
Johnson offers a comparison of prosecutorial systems in Japan and the United States. His
analysis is based on participant observation and in-depth, unstructured interviewing over a period
of approximately one thousand days, primarily in the Japanese cities of Kobe and Tokyo, and
Alameda County, California.27 Supporting this research with a wide array of data-gathering that
included examination of court and prosecutorial records, surveys, and reviews of existing
literature, Johnson brought together the disparate facets of prosecutorial systems in Japan and the
United States, offering a significant contribution to the body of knowledge about both systems.
Johnson offers a template of prosecutorial systems for both the United States and Japan,
serving as a starting point for comparing the two systems. For the United States, prosecution
includes, very generally, these stages:
1. An arrest
2. The prosecutor makes an initial charge decision
3. The accused is brought before a judge or magistrate for arraignment, and is shown the
charge, bail is determined, and counsel is identified or appointed
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4. Probable cause is determined through a preliminary hearing or grand jury
5. Guilt or innocence is determined through a trial, or plea, or dismissal
6. Sentence is imposed.28
This is then contrasted with the Japanese prosecutorial model:
1. The initiation of cases: generally the police do not initiate by arrest; rather they consult
with the prosecutor, and the overwhelming majority of cases are submitted to prosecutors
without there being an arrest. Johnson states that “police arrest fewer than 20 percent of all
suspected Penal Code violators.”29
2. Once a suspect is arrested, police have forty-eight hours to transfer the suspect and
case to prosecutors; but if the suspect is not arrested the investigator (and the prosecutor) have no
formal time constraints.
3. Pre-charge detention and interrogation: According to Johnson, “If prosecutors believe
a suspect should be detained further, they must ask a judge, within twenty-four hours of
receiving the case, to approve up to ten days of additional detention. They may later ask for
another ten-day extension. Judges rarely reject these requests for detention. In all, police and
prosecutors can detain a suspect for up to twenty days afterwards (twenty-five days for crimes
such as insurrection). During the pre-charge period, interrogations are long, thorough, and
intense. Police and prosecutors routinely interrogate suspects several times for hours each
time.”30
4. The prosecutor then makes the decision to charge or not charge. There
are no “probable cause” hearings, no arraignments, and the accused has no right to be advised by
an attorney nor any right to bail until the prosecutor makes the charging decision.
5. Serious cases are then formally prosecuted and tried in either a district or summary
court; most minor offenses are prosecuted in summary courts upon the consent of the accused.
6. A one-phase trial is conducted, consisting of one or three judges, where the judges
announce a verdict and impose a sentence in the same proceeding. Except for Okinawa, there are
no juries, and 94 percent of the cases are brought before the court for trial within six months.
Although adversarial in design, most trials include the defendant’s confession. Unlike in the
United States, prosecutors can appeal an acquittal, and any other decision by the trial court.31
As Johnson notes, the “monopoly power to charge” possessed by prosecutors in Japan is
a significant difference when compared to the sharing of power found in the United States, and
“concentrates more charging power in the prosecutor in Japan than in almost any other
democratic country.”32 Also significant is the power to detain and interrogate suspects for
substantial periods of time, the power to use a number of tools designed to compel confessions,
and the power to introduce at trial the fruits of detentions and interrogations.33

B.
The Imbalance of Power Between Prosecutor and Judge
As Johnson notes in introducing the topic of prosecutors and judges, the judiciary in prewar Japan was not independent nor a separate branch of government, but was instead a “‘semiindependent’ organ in the Ministry of Justice,” and the Ministry of Justice was (and is today) run
by prosecutors, “who ‘controlled all budgetary and administrative matters of the judiciary,
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including the appointment, promotion, transfer, supervision, and dismissal of judges and court
officials.’”34 Postwar changes to the structure, according to Johnson, gave judges independence
and power they did not have prior to the war, but “judges seldom use their newfound powers to
check prosecutor behavior. Whether during investigation, at trial, or concerning the charge
decision, prosecutors get what they want from judges with notably few exceptions.”35
Telling in the relationship between judges and prosecutors in Japan, is the role of judges
in pre-charge events. As noted, there is no right to bail nor access to counsel until the prosecutor
charges an accused, and by that time the accused may have been detained and repeatedly
interrogated for over three weeks. Court involvement is required for such a detention, but
according to Johnson, courts overwhelmingly support requests for precharge detention, rejecting
the detention request only one in every 705 requests (in 1992 prosecutors requested 77,545
investigative detentions, and judges refused in only 110 cases).36 Similarly, prosecutors can rely
on nearly complete support by judges with respect to bail. No bail is available until after the
prosecutor charges the accused, and the court solicits input from the prosecutor seeking what is
in effect confirmation that the accused has confessed and the prosecutor’s conclusion that the
defendant will abide by his or her confession during trial. “Suspects who insist on their
innocence stand only a tiny chance of being released.37 Simply put, suspects who do not confess
do not get bail.”38
C.

Abuse in the Prosecutorial Functions: Confessions, Brutality, and
Secrecy

Consistently sounded themes in comparisons between prosecutorial systems in Japan and
the United States include assessments of the role of confessions, the use of prosecutorial
intimidation to obtain those confessions, and the absence of media attention in pre-charge
criminal proceedings. Johnson refers to confessions as “the heart” of Japanese criminal justice.39
Prosecutors in Japan work in an environment driven by confessions, one that considers
confessions to be a paramount goal of all prosecutions.40 Where prosecutors in the United States
may have become inured to the use of plea bargains as a means of effective docket control,
Japanese prosecutors extract their key prosecutorial weapon before the charge is made, during
interrogation and outside the reach of public scrutiny.
Also beyond public scrutiny is the process of procuring these confessions. Media
accounts and Johnson’s own experiences while in Japan reinforce the logical notion that when
hidden from public view, the process of extracting confessions may readily tolerate physical and
mental abuse by the interrogators. In one study by the Tokyo Bar Association and described by
Johnson, thirty-three former suspects had given false confessions, admitting to crimes they had
not committed. On average, according to the study, “suspects in this study were interrogated for
sixty-two days, and even the median suspect was interrogated for forty-four days. The longest
day of interrogation per suspect averaged thirteen hours. Assuming that a typical day of
interrogation lasted three hours instead of thirteen – a conservative conjecture indeed – the
median suspect was interrogated for 132 hours. . . .” By comparison, one recent estimate of
interrogation practices in the United States found that “92 percent of suspects were interrogated
for two hours or less.”41 Further, during the interrogations, the suspects reported repeatedly
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being slapped, kicked, punched or otherwise beaten by interrogators.42 In one instance reported
directly by Johnson based on his field interviews in Japan, more than one prosecutor
acknowledged forcing suspects to stand on their heads, ‘to get more blood flowing into the brains
of people who are not thinking clearly.”43
One of the significant concerns raised by Johnson in his description of the process of
extracting confessions in Japan is the complacency of the media. In a representative comment,
Johnson quotes a journalist as saying that “in Japan, writing critical investigative articles is not a
press custom. We know there are areas where we better not tread. . . . We don’t make bold
criticisms because if we did, we’d be shut off from information and unable to perform our jobs. .
. . We have struck a kind of bargain: prosecutors give us information, and we given them good
[uncritical] coverage. Of course, prosecutors don’t say directly that if we write so-and-so we’ll
get shut out of the loop, but everyone understands the deal. Prosecutors are our superiors and we
are their supplicants. We have to be humble and play by their rules.”44
IV.

Application of the Lessons

A.
The Consequence of Secrecy
Justice Kennedy’s exhortation that members of the legal community resist mandatory
minimum sentence schemes is based, it appears, on a recognition that certain responsibilities in
the criminal justice system cannot be delegated to the executive branch without a significant risk
of loss of fundamental fairness. Courts act in a very public way, facing the victims, the accused,
the press, and the legal community, all in stark contrast to the decision making process employed
by prosecutors when deciding what charges to press against a suspect. Legislative action like that
which is found in the USA Patriot Act and other post-9/11 legislation gravitates consistently
towards sealing off critical parts of the criminal justice system from public scrutiny and judicial
oversight. Secrecy of the proceedings is a baldly accepted goal of this legislation, and should be
regarded with great caution.
As Michael T. McCarthy expressed the point, secrecy blocks the very tools needed for
maintaining checks and balances over governmental excesses:
One significant hurdle to effective oversight of how the executive
branch uses its new powers is secrecy. [fn omitted] The more
politically accountable branch provides an effective check on
executive authority only when the legislature is responsive to
citizen concerns, which depends on abuses of discretion being
discovered. There can be no public outcry and congressional
pressure over abuse of secret [Foreign Intelligence Standards Act]
warrants if targets are unaware of the surveillance; there can be no
habeas corpus proceedings for immigrants secretly detained. Since
voters and attorneys will be unable to raise abuses of secret
procedures, Congress and the courts must be aggressive in acting
sua sponte to monitor how the powers granted by the USA Patriot
Act are being used.”45
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Courts and all in the legal community have an obligation to ensure sufficient judicial
oversight exists to provide at least minimum safeguards against the abuse of persons and the
abuse of power by prosecutors and investigators. Secrecy is a powerful tool, one that
traditionally has been
kept in fairly close check by courts. The events of September 11 have not weakened the need for
control over the excesses of our government over the governed.
B.
The Consequence of Enhanced Prosecutorial Discretion
A key cultural difference noted by Johnson in his examination of prosecutorial culture in
Japan is its reliance on a hierarchical review of prosecutorial decision making. Johnson credits
close internal controls and collaborative decision making between prosecutors and his or her
supervisors as likely reasons for that country’s high conviction rate. “Managers in Japan further
specify rules for performance by requiring operators to clear decisions with supervisors, chiefly
through the kessai system of consultation and approval. In order to make charge and sentence
recommendation decisions, operators must consult with and obtain the approval of two or three
managers, depending on the seriousness of the case.”46 In practical terms, close vetting of
charges before actually filing of charges reduces the risk of erroneous criminal prosecution. If
the team effectively tests the relative strengths and weaknesses of a case, the process will reduce
the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. There are few acquittals in Japanese criminal trials
because, as Johnson puts it, “prosecutors have already ‘acquitted’ suspects who might have been
acquitted at trial.”47
There is no comparable system in the United States, designed to thoroughly screen cases
so as to reject cases in a manner similar to that used in Japan. To the extent post-9/11 legislation
expands prosecutorial authority without engendering some concomitant level of accountability
and efficacy like the kessai system of internal checks on prosecutorial discretion, there is a
substantial risk that prosecutors will abuse their increased authority, all in the name of national
security. This should be a cause for some concern. As one commentator put it:
Ultimately, the debate over the USA Patriot Act is just as much
about the delegation of executive authority as it is about civil
liberties. If the Administration exercises its new authorities with
respect for civil liberties, and Congress provides appropriate
oversight to prove that this has been the case, then the USA Patriot
Act will have been a wise and timely piece of legislation in a
national crisis. If the Administration fails to use restraint, and
Congress and the courts let down their guard, however, the USA
Patriot Act could become another chapter in America’s history of
suspending Constitutional values during difficult times.”48
V.

Conclusion
Justice Kennedy’s call to the legal profession to show a collective concern against
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sentencing legislation that deprives courts of discretion is a call not based on constitutional
concepts as much as it is based on public policy. As we know from the Court’s review of
mandatory minimum sentences and “three strikes” sentencing schemes, our constitution tolerates
such schemes, at least as construed by the majority of the current Supreme Court.49 And so too it
may be that the enhanced prosecutorial powers created under the USA Patriot Act and other
legislation enacted in response to the attacks of September 11 will ultimately pass judicial
muster. For reasons similar to those expressed by Justice Kennedy, however, legislation that
shifts power from courts to prosecutors must be viewed with substantial and close scrutiny.
Much can be learned from a prosecutorial scheme that bestows the depth of authority
shown in Japan, if for no reason other than the fact that so much power is given to the prosecutor
prior to the time charges are made against an accused. Clearly the present Administration would
have its Attorney General have at least as broad a set of powers as is currently in place in Japan.
Should such a shift of power become a reality, indeed if it already done so, it would seem
incumbent upon all judges and lawyers to monitor such a shift in power closely indeed.

1.Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 282 (2001).
2. Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development: USA Patriot Act, 39 Harv. J. on Legis.
435 at 435, citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 282 (2001) and Bill Summary and Status, H.R.
3162, at http://thomas.loc.gov.
3.McCarthy, p. 449, citing John Lancaster, Hill Puts Brakes on Expanding Police Powers,
Washington Post, September 30, 1991, at A6.
4. McCarthy, p. 449, citing Pub. L. No. 107-56 Section 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351 (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. section 1228(a) (2001)).
5.Publ. L. No. 104-132 sections 422-23, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270-72 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
sections 1252, 1961 (1996)).
6.McCarthy at p. 449, citing Fact Sheet, American Civil Liberties Union, How the USAPatriot Act Permits Indefinite Detention of Immigrants Who Are Not Terrorists (October 23,
2001, at http:///www.aclu.org./gongres/1102301e.html; see also David Cole, National Security
State, Nation, December 17, 2001, at 4; Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001) (statement of David D.
Cole, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/te100301sc-role.htm, and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Publ. L. No. 104-132 sections 422-23, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270-72 (co0fified at 8
U.S.C. sections 1252, 1961 (1996), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
7.McCarthy, p. 449-50, citing Fact Sheet, American Civil Liberties Union, How the
USA-Patriot Act Permits Indefinite Detention of Immigrants Who Are Not Terrorists (October
23, 2001, at http:///www.aclu.org./congress/1102301e.html); see also David Cole, National
Security State, NATION, December 17, 2001, at 4; Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the
Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and

Page 13 of 15

Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Oct. 3, 2001) (statement of
David D. Cole, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/te100301sc-role.htm, and Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Publ. L. No. 104-132 sections 422-23, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270-72 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
sections 1252, 1961 (1996), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
8.McCarthy, p. 450, citing Pub. L. No. 107-56 Section 411, 115 Stat. 272, 346-48, Fact
Sheet, American Civil Liberties Union, How the USA-Patriot Act Allows for Detention and
Deportation of People Engaging in Innocent Associational Activity (October 23, 2001, at
http:///www.aclu.org./congress/1102301h.html).
9.66 Fed. Reg. 10,390 (September 20, 2001)
10.Administrative Comment: “Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment
on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. Section 287.3, Submitted on behalf of Immigrant Rights Clinic,
New York University School of Law, 26 New York University Review of Law and Social
Change 397, 397-98 (2000/2001)
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. David Garland, Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society
(University of Chicago Press 2001).
14. Id., p. 56
15. Garland, p. 59, citing Andrew von Hirsch in “Doing Justice: The Choice of
Punishments – The Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration” and also by Fair and
Certain Punishment, the report of the Twentieth-Century Fund Task Force (1976).
16. Garland, p. 59
17.Garland, p. 59
18.Garland, pl 59, citing James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (1975).
19. Garland, p. 106-07
20.p. 109
21.Garland, p. 110
22.Garland, p. 143
23. [W. Kaminer, It’s All the Rage: Crime and Culture (New York: Addison-Wesley,
1995) p.71] Garland, p. 144
24. See, Bob Egelko, The San Francisco Chronicle, “High Court Justice Crusades for
Mercy; He Calls Sentences Too Severe, Too Long,” 2A August 10, 2003.
25. [McCarthy, p. 448 (“The surveillance and money laundering provisions of the USA
Patriot Act are good examples of how September 11 provided the impetus to pass reforms that
Congress had been moving towards at a glacial pace.”)]
26. [See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, “Why is the Japanese Conviction
Rate So High?”, University of Chicago, 30 J. Legal Stud. 53 (2001), Marcia E. Goodman, “The
Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan,” 5 Pacific Basin Law Journal 16
(1986), Daniel H. Foote, “Prosecutorial Discretion: A Response (to Goodman),” 5 Pacific Basin

Page 14 of 15

Law Journal 96 (1986), Satyanshu Mukherjee, “What’s So Good About the Low Crime Rate in
Japan?”, The Australian Rationalist (December-March 1994-1995) 7-17; and other references
noted in David Johnson, “The Japanese Way of Justice,”(Oxford 2002) pp. 4-17 and notes
accompanying text.]
27. [Johnson, p. 8-12]
28. [Johnson, p. 13]
29. [Johnson, p. 13]
30. [Johnson, p. 14]
31.[Johnson, p. 14-15]
32.[Johnson, p. 37, noting the possible exception of South Korea.]
33. [Johnson, p. 38-39]
34. [Johnson, p. 61, citing Percy R. Luney, “the Constitution of Japan: The Fifth
Decade,” 53 Law and Contemporary Problems, nos. 1 and 2,137 (Winter and Spring Special
Issue1990)]
35. [Johnson, p. 61]
36. [Johnson, p. 62]
37.[citing Futaba Igarishi, 1989 “Coerced Confessions and Pretrial Detention in Japan,”
Paper presented at the 41st Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Reno,
Nevada November 11, 1989]
38. [Johnson, p. 62]
39.[Johnson, p. 243]
40. [Johnson, p. 243]
41.[Johnson, p. 253, citing Richard A Leo., Inside the Interrogation Room.” 86 Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 266 (1996)]
42. [Johnson, p. 254.
43. [Johnson, p. 254]
44.[Johnson, p. 262]
45.McCarthy, p. 452.
46.Johnson, p. 130
47.Johnson, p. 226
48.McCarthy, p. 453
49. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2002) (California state court’s
affirmance of two consecutive prison terms of 25 years to life for “third strike” conviction held
not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law).

Page 15 of 15

